

Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze Diary.

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The “ministerial” part of the conference on the “open skies” regime. The poster of the conference—village, country sky with bucolic sheep shapes of clouds. A very deep symbol of openness. But judging by everything, the conference will descend from the heavens down to earth, specifically, the European earth, even more specifically—the German [soil].

Before our visit here, Kohl and Genscher paid a hasty visit to Moscow. And just as hastily—in the opinion of E.A.—Gorbachev accepted the right of the Germans to unity and self-determination.

The subject of German unity is not at all a bucolic sheep in the skies of the world. For some, it is a terrible thunder cloud, and for us it is an altogether thick fog on the horizon.

The conference hall is a train station for many. Ideas are like trains, they come and go but on single schedule and timetable—the European one.

Baker: Recently I looked into the hole breached in the German Wall ... Walls are falling everywhere. The march of freedom has begun ... The end of Stalin’s concept “Security for the Soviet Union means insecurity for others.”

Hurd: The Cold War has ended but instead Europe is getting a renaissance of nationalism, which so catastrophically exhibited its destructive force in the first and second world wars ...

Dumas: Many of the ministers present here were persecuted by “overwrought” dictatorships ... Before, we had no security without super-armaments. [Now] there will be no security without super-trust.

Skubiszewski: Poland was one of the sources of changes on the continent. The word “Solidarity” acquired an all-European, moreover, Atlantic meaning.

Dandy Skubiszewski shows off his knowledge of languages. Switches from English into French to impress the French-speaking Canada. But he speaks about substance—about guarantees of inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border.

The Netherlands’ Van den Broek remembers (not his own memories) how in 1955 in Geneva at the conference right before Khrushchev’s presentation it started to thunder, the electricity shorted and it became pitch-dark.

This way, with jokes and puns everybody talked about Germany (*Deutschland uber alles*), and we talked about the open skies. But—[we] spoke well, which was noted by the esteemed Douglas Hurd, a minister in unpolished shoes.

--You have a very informal style. I especially liked it about the space where we don’t just grow chickens. We listen to you, and not only get educated, but entertained too.

The conversation was circling about the status of united Germany, the lagging behind of the all-European process, the possible 2+4 mechanism, or, depending who's proposing, 4+2.

One more meeting, with Skubiszewski, who raised issue of Poland's participation in the process, mainly from the point of view of formulating guarantees of inviolability of its borders.

The key meeting of the day was with Baker. [He] proposed to discuss two questions: first, about the numbers of Soviet and American troops in Europe (the issue was raised at the February meeting of the ministers in Moscow), which was left outside this diary); and the second, about "managing German unification within the 2+4 framework, about which I also told you in Moscow."

On the first issue, they disagreed on numbers in Moscow, decided to continue the conversation, and so now Baker says:

--We would like stick to our previous position—to reduce our and your troops in Central Europe to the level of 195 thousands on each side on the condition that U.S. troops in Europe overall will not exceed 225 thousand. Even you withdraw from Eastern Europe, you still remain a great power on the continent, whereas we, if we withdrew beyond the ocean, we would lose our influence over European affairs.

Formula "two plus four" takes into account interests of all the main players in this game and responds affirmatively to the question of future presence of the Soviet troops in the territory of the present GDR.

The earlier we announce our agreements, the more chances there are to slow down the collapse of the GDR.

E.A. said that he needed to think and to consult with Moscow—that the he is not worried about the first issue, and the second one does not promise any special hopes, but still, let us try...

From this moment, the plot of the Ottawa meeting acquired a new development turning into an acute political thriller.

[Source: Hoover Institute Archive. Stepanov-Mamaladze Collection. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya].



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