8 Messages de forum

• Le terrorisme islamique est une création des États-Unis (Capitaine Martin) 16 janvier 2013 20:00, par Visiteur

  The Crisis in Mali : Will French Air Strikes Stop the Islamist Advance ?

  http://world.time.com/2013/01/11/th…

  By Alex Perry Jan. 11, 2013

  

  Fighters of the Islamic group Ansar Dine stand guard at the Kidal Airport in northern Mali on Aug. 7, 2012

  Cliquer sur l’image ou ci-dessous pour l’agrandir :

  http://mai68.org/spip/IMG/jpg/Ansar-Dine.jpg

  After ignoring it for the best part of a year, the world has suddenly woken up to the crisis in Mali — and its considered response seems to be : panic. On Jan. 9, the Islamist forces that captured northern Mali last year resumed their advance south and the next day took a small town about 700 km from the capital, Bamako. It’s not known whether the Islamists were attempting to go all the way to Bamako and take the entire country. Until now, they seem to have been content to retain the north, where most of the Malian elements in their ranks are from. But the reaction to the limited Islamist push has been dramatic. Mali’s government begged France to intervene. The Beninese chairman of the African Union demanded that NATO act. Even the Canadian Prime Minister urged international action. In response, the U.N. Security Council held an emergency session Jan. 10 to pass a resolution calling for the “swift deployment” of an international intervention force.

  Then on Jan. 11 French French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius confirmed reports from the ground that France had carried out at least one air strike against the Islamists, though he gave no details. Earlier in the day, eyewitness reports from the ground indicated a limited number of European soldiers, perhaps 50 men in all, had arrived in the area. The intervention came just as President François Hollande announced that French troops had joined Mali’s routed army in a counteroffensive against Islamist militias. Diplomats privately confirmed that the campaign also involved troops from Senegal and Nigeria. “French armed forces this afternoon provided support to Malian troops to fight against these terrorist elements,” Hollande said, noting the French intervention would last “as long as necessary” — and adding that the move was also made to protect 6,000 French citizens in the West African country. “The terrorists should know that France will always be there when what’s at stake is … the right of a people [those of Mali] … to live in freedom and democracy.”

  (MORE : Mali’s Crisis : Is the Plan for Western Intervention ‘Crap’ ?)

  Though his words and actions might bring to mind an America of more than a decade ago — and a U.S. Administration that France implacably opposed — Hollande is at least right to fear the threat from Mali. The chaos began at the start of 2012 when an alliance of Islamist and ethnic Tuareg insurgents launched a rebellion in the north of the country complaining, as the Tuaregs often do, of marginalization. The situation was aggravated in March when the Malian army mutinied and the Islamists-Tuaregs used the confusion to take the entire north in days, including the ancient city of Timbuktu. Then, in June and July, the Islamists turned on the Tuaregs, kicked them out and imposed Shari’a law. Since then the Islamists have ruled the north alone, creating a de facto al-Qaeda state three hours’ flight south of Europe.

  At first, Europe and Africa were slow to respond to the new danger. By the end of last year, however, France had become an aggressive proponent of international intervention. Paris has two reasons for being concerned. First, history. There is still a lingering colonial attitude in Paris that France is primus inter pares among foreign players in the region : West Africa is part of la francophonie — the French-speaking world — and France demands and assumes the role of lead international player there. Second, and not unrelated, there is a (probably well-founded) fear in France that a radical Islamist Mali threatens France most of all, since most of the Islamists are French speakers and many have relatives in France. (Intelligence sources in Paris have told TIME that they’ve identified aspiring jihadis leaving France for northern Mali to train and fight.) Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of the three groups that make up the Malian Islamist alliance and which provides much of the leadership, has also designated France — the representative of Western power in the region — as a prime target for attack.

  But while everyone had agreed on the need for action, no one wanted to be the one to actually do it. The Islamists have made tens of millions of dollars from ransoming Western hostages and cocaine smuggling and spent much of it on acquiring large parts of Muammar Gaddafi’s arsenal, brought into Mali by Tuareg troops who fought for the former Libyan dictator.

  Facing off against them is a Malian army that is demoralized, rarely paid, sometimes barely fed, and poorly armed. Backstopping it in any fight under long-discussed plans were also meant to be Mali’s West African neighbors, represented by the West African regional grouping, ECOWAS. But divided, dysfunctional and with mostly similarly ragged armies at its disposal, ECOWAS has so far produced little in the way of solid troop commitments.

  (MORE : Mali’s Endless Crisis : Army Soldiers Force Out Prime Minister)

  These uncomfortable realities made an earlier U.N.-French plan — in which a West African force of 3,000 would fight the Islamists, while French and U.S. trainers would assist the Malian army in doing the same — “crap,” in the delicate leaked words of the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Susan Rice. Indeed, the notion that an African intervention force had remained an idea rather than a reality was recognized in the U.N.’s initial resolution in favor of military action in Mali, passed on Dec. 20, which clarified that any force was unlikely to deploy until September. Hollande’s description of that earlier resolution as a game changer seemed emptier still when considered against the Islamists’ holding of at least seven French hostages — specifically, as one Islamist commander told TIME last year, to safeguard against any French action. And if war was a poor prospect, peace talks weren’t a great option either. The last round didn’t even include the Islamists, broke up in December without any resolution and was in any case hosted by Burkina Faso, whose security services have long been suspected of benefiting commercially from Islamist kidnappings.

  The French intervention is a tacit admission that Rice was right : a new plan, and a whole new sense of dynamism, was needed. More practically, it was also a recognition that the Malian army would offer little resistance if the Islamists pushed farther south toward Bamako. It remains unclear how extensive the French action will be, though, crucially, the requisite protocols for consensual Western intervention have now been observed. Since Iraq, NATO and the West now wait to be asked to intervene, rather than taking unilateral action ; that appears to have happened — at least informally — with Mali’s and the A.U.’s plea for action. Hollande also made a point of noting that the deployment of French forces took place “within the framework of international law.”

  But if Mali and the A.U. might prefer to rely on the West, the West — mindful of how interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq turned out and keen for Africa to find solutions to its own problems, even if it is the West that ends up footing the bill — remains reluctant to shoulder all the burden in Mali. The war talk at the U.N. and in Paris shouldn’t obscure the reality that the world isn’t done yet playing pass-the-buck on Mali. Should that vacuum continue, the Islamists can only consolidate their grip.

  With reporting by Bruce Crumley/Paris _MORE : Africa Rising

  ---

  

  Alex Perry @PerryAlexJ

  Alex Perry is TIME’s Africa bureau chief, based in Cape Town and covering 48 countries across the continent. He has worked for TIME for 10 years, in Africa and Asia and the Middle East.

  Perry’s latest book is Lifeblood : How to Save the World, One Dead Mosquito at a Time.

• Le terrorisme islamique est une création des États-Unis (Capitaine Martin) 16 janvier 2013 20:49, par Visiteur

  Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libyan_Islamic_Fighting_Group

  The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) also known as Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya (Arabic : الجماعة الإسلامية المقاتلة بليبيا‎) is a group active in Libya which played a key role in deposing Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, allying itself with the National Transitional Council. However the organisation has a troubled history being under pressure from Muammar Gaddafi and shortly after the 9-11 attacks, LIFG was banned worldwide (as an affiliate of al-Qaeda) by the UN 1267 Committee.[4][6] Listed at the Foreign Terrorist Organizations,[7] the group has denied ever being affiliated with al-Qaeda, stating that it refused to join the global Islamic front Osama bin Laden declared against the west in 1998.[8] Members of the group participated in the Libyan civil war under the name Libyan Islamic Movement (al-Harakat al-Islamiya al-Libiya).

  History

  LIFG was founded in 1990 by Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It aims to establish an Islamic state in Libya and views the Gaddafi regime as oppressive, and anti-Muslim, according to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. LIFG claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt against Gaddafi in February 1996, which was in part funded by MI6 according to David Shayler, and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during the mid-to-late 1990s.[9] They continue to target Libyan interests and may engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces.[10]

  Adnkronos International reported that the group was founded in Afghanistan by Abu Laith Al Libi and other veterans of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.[11]

  Relationship with al Qaeda

  The LIFG links to Al-Qaeda hail from Afghanistan, where hundreds joined Al-Qaeda. High ranking LIFG operatives inside Al-Qaeda, are the leader of the insurgency Abdel-Hakim Belhadj (also known as Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq), and the recently killed Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was killed in a CIA drone strike, and Al-Qaeda’s Abu Yahya al-Libi.[12]

  The Telegraph reported that senior Al Qaeda members Abu Yahya al-Libi and Abu Laith al-Libi were LIFG members.[13] One of al-Qaeda’s most senior members, Atiyah Abdul-Rahman, was purportedly a member of LIFG as well.[14]

  In an audio message published in November 2007 Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith al-Libi claimed that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group had joined al-Qaeda.[11][15][16] "Benotman fired back an open letter to Zawahiri questioning his credibility. "I questioned their idea of jihad … directly you know. This is crazy, it is not Islamic and it’s against the Sunni understanding of Islam," Benotman told CNN. Zawahiri chose not to respond. As late as this August Zawahiri’s video statements included praise of LIFG leaders, in what may have been a desperate attempt to head off the condemnation he could see coming."[17]

  In November 2007 Noman Benotman, described as the "ex-head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group", published on open letter to al-Qaeda.[18][19][20] According to The Times :[19]

  "In November last year Noman Benotman, ex-head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group which is trying to overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, published a letter which asked Al-Qaeda to give up all its operations in the Islamic world and in the West, adding that ordinary westerners were blameless and should not be attacked."

  Noman Benotman’s letter to Zawahiri was published in Akhbar Libya (News) as an op-ed clarification in November 2007. The gist is that al-Qaeda’s efforts have been counterproductive and used as "subterfuge" by some Western countries to extend their regional ambitions. These comments were first aired at a meeting in Kandahar in the summer of 2000.[21]

  On 10 July 2009, The Telegraph reported that some member organisations of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group had split with Al Qaeda.[13]

  UK Terrorism Act 2000

  On October 10, 2005, the United Kingdom’s Home Office banned LIFG and fourteen other militant groups from operating in the UK. Under the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000, being a member of a LIFG is punishable with a 10-year prison term.[22] The Financial Sanctions Unit of the Bank of England acting on behalf of HM Treasury issued the orders to freeze all their assets.[23] Mohammed Benhammedi lived and worked in Liverpool at the time of the UN sanction against him. Sergey Zakurko, the father to his Lithuanian mistress was suspended from his job at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) for fear that the link could pose a security threat.[24]

  UN-embargoed LIFG affiliates and their subsequent de-listing

  On 7 February 2006 the UN embargoed five specific LIFG members and four corporations, all of whom had continued to operate in England until at least October 2005. Those nine are in the following table ; the accusations are according to the US State Department.[25]

  CLIC to see image : http://mai68.org/spip/IMG/jpg/Accusations_US-State_Department.jpg

  The "Summary of Evidence" from Mohammed Fenaitel Mohamed Al Daihani’s Combatant Status Review Tribunal. states : "The Sanabal Charitable Committee is considered a fund raising front for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group."[28]

  In June 2011, all of the entities included in the table above were de-listed by the United Nations Security Council Committee.[29]

  Reconciliation and mass release of prisoners

  In September 2009 a new "code" for jihad, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies", was published after more than two years of intense and secret talks between incarcerated leaders of the LIFG and Libyan security officials.

  On April 9, 2008, Al Jazeera reported that Libya released at least over 90 members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.[11][16] The Italian press agency Adnkronos International reported the release was due to the efforts of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, a son of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, and leader of the charity Gaddafi International Foundation for Charity Associations. It reported that a third of the LIFG members Libya was holding were released. A further 200 prisoners were released in March 2010, including group leader Abdelhakim Belhadj.[30][31]

  In January 2011 members of the group threatened a return to violence unless still imprisoned members were released.[32]

  Libyan civil war

  In March 2011, members of the LIFG in Ajdabiya declared to the press that the group supports the revolt against Gaddafi’s rule, and had placed themselves under the leadership of the National Transitional Council. They also stated that the group had changed its name to Libyan Islamic Movement (al-Harakat al-Islamiya al-Libiya), had around 500–600 militants released from jail in recent years, and denied any past or present affiliation with Al-Qaeda.[33]

  A leader of the LIFG, Abdelhakim Belhadj, became the commander of the Tripoli Military Council after the rebels took over Tripoli during the 2011 Battle of Tripoli. On March 2011, Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi, a leading member of the group, admit to the Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore that his fighters had al-Qaeda links.[34] Al-Hasidi was captured in 2002 in Peshwar, Pakistan, later handed over to the US, and then held in Libya before being released in 2008. He admit in the same interview that he had earlier fought against "the foreign invasion" of Afghanistan.[34]

  In September 2011, Ismail Sallabi (a leader of LIFG) said in an interview to the Washington Post : “We want [Libyan Islamic Movement] to be a good government that comes from Islam, that respects human rights and personal freedoms,” “The Islamic way is not something dangerous or wrong. The West hears ‘Islamic law’ and they think we want to lock our women in boxes,” “The Islamic groups want a democratic country, and they want to go to the mosque without being arrested. They’re looking for freedom like everyone else.”[35]

  Notes See here : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libyan…

  

• Le terrorisme islamique est une création des États-Unis (Capitaine Martin) 16 janvier 2013 21:08, par Visiteur

  Book | August 15, 2009

  Which Path to Persia ? : Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran

  http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2009/whichpathtopersia

  What do we do about Iran ? The Islamic Republic presents a confounding series of challenges for the Obama administration. Over the past thirty years, Washington has produced an unimpressive track record of policies — ranging from undeclared warfare to unilateral concessions — that have limited some Iranian mischief-making but have largely failed to convince Tehran to drop its support for terrorist groups, its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, or its wider efforts to overturn the regional status quo.

  Which Path to Persia ? objectively presents the most important policy options available to the United States in crafting a new strategy toward Iran. It considers four different types of solutions : diplomacy, military, regime change, and containment. Among the diplomatic options are one approach that would employ "bigger carrots and bigger sticks" and a strategy of pure engagement that would abandon sanctions and focus on changing Iran’s strategic perceptions. The various military options include a full-scale invasion, an air campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and allowing an Israeli air strike against the same. Regime change could take the form of triggering a popular revolution, supporting an insurgency, or aiding a military coup. Last, containment would involve deterring Iran from trying to wield a future nuclear arsenal while hindering its ability to cause trouble in the region.

  As Iran moves forward with its nuclear program, the urgency increases for the United States to implement a new policy. This distinguished group of authors, all senior fellows with the Saban Center at Brookings, points out that no one strategy is ideal and that all involve heavy costs, significant risks, and potentially painful trade-offs. With an eye to these perils, they address how the different options could be combined to produce an integrated strategy that makes the best choice from a bad lot.

  Purchase the Book

  Order from Brookings Institution Press

  $22.95 (Paper Text) : http://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/ecom…

• Le terrorisme islamique est une création des États-Unis (Capitaine Martin) 16 janvier 2013 21:36, par Visiteur

  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mek.htm

  Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
  National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA)
  People’s Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI)
  National Council of Resistance (NCR)
  National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)
  Muslim Iranian Student’s Society

  It was reported on 21 September 2012, that the US State Department was preparing to remove the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization from the list of organizations recognized as terrorist groups by the United States. On 28 September 2012, the US State Department formally announced that it had delisted the organization as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. The decision took into account the MEK’s public renunciation of violence, the absence of confirmed acts of terrorism by the MEK for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base.

  The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime affected the circumstances of the designated foreign terrorist organization Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). The MEK was allied with the Iraqi regime and received most of its support from it. The MEK assisted the Hussein regime in suppressing opposition within Iraq, and performed internal security for the Iraqi regime. The National Liberation Army was the military wing of the National Council of Resistance of Iran.

  Mujahedin-e-Khalq [MEK] facilities in Iraq included

  • . Camp Ashraf, the MEK military headquarters, is about 100 kilometers west of the Iranian border and 100 kilometers north of Baghdad near Khalis
  • . Camp Anzali near the town of Jalawla [Jalula] (120-130 km (70-80 miles) northeast of Baghdad and about 40-60 km (20-35 miles) from the border with Iran)
  • . Camp Faezeh in Kut
  • . Camp Habib in Basra
  • . Camp Homayoun in Al-Amarah
  • . Camp Bonyad Alavi near the city of Miqdadiyah in Mansourieh [about 65 miles northeast of Baghdad]

  On 10 May 2003 V Corps accepted the voluntary consolidation of the Mujahedin-E-Khalq’s forces, and subsequent control over those forces. This process is expected to take several days to complete. Previously, V Corps was monitoring a cease-fire brokered between the MEK and Special Forces elements. The MEK forces had been abiding by the terms of this agreement and are cooperating with Coalition soldiers.

  By mid-May 2003 Coalition forces had consolidated 2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, air defense artillery pieces and miscellaneous vehicles formerly in the possession of the Mujahedin-E Khalq (MEK) forces. The 4th Infantry Division also reported they have destroyed most of the MEK munitions and caches. The voluntary, peaceful resolution of this process by the MEK and the Coalition significantly contributed to the Coalition’s mission to establish a safe and secure environment for the people of Iraq. The 4,000 MEK members in the Camp Ashraf former Mujahedeen base were consolidated, detained, disarmed and were screened for any past terrorist acts.

  The United States, which lists National Council of Resistance of Iran as a terrorist organization, closed the NCRI’s Washington office in 2003.

  Description

  Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) is the largest and most militant group opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Also known as the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran, MEK is led by husband and wife Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. MEK was added to the U.S. State Department’s list of foreign terrorist groups in 1997.

  MEK was founded in the 1960s by a group of college-educated Iranian leftists opposed to the country’s pro-Western ruler, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Although the group took part in the 1979 Islamic revolution that replaced the shah with a Shiite Islamist regime, MEK’s ideology, a blend of Marxism and Islamism, put it at odds with the postrevolutionary government. In 1981, the group was driven from its bases on the Iran-Iraq border and resettled in Paris, where it began supporting Iraq in its eight-year war against Khomeini’s Iran. In 1986, MEK moved its headquarters to Iraq where it received its primary support to attack the regime in Iran. During the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. forces cracked down on MEK’s bases in Iraq, and in June 2003 French authorities raided an MEK compound outside Paris and arrested 160 people, including Maryam Rajavi.

  Activities

  The group has targeted Iranian government officials and government facilities in Iran and abroad ; during the 1970s, it attacked Americans in Iran. While the group says it does not intentionally target civilians, it has often risked civilian casualties. It routinely aims its attacks at government buildings in crowded cities. MEK terrorism has declined since late 2001. Incidents linked to the group include :

  • . The series of mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids during 2000 and 2001 against Iranian government buildings ; one of these killed Iran’s chief of staff
  • . The 2000 mortar attack on President Mohammad Khatami’s palace in Tehran
  • . The February 2000 "Operation Great Bahman," during which MEK launched 12 attacks against Iran
  • . The 1999 assassination of the deputy chief of Iran’s armed forces general staff, Ali Sayyad Shirazi
  • . The 1998 assassination of the director of Iran’s prison system, Asadollah Lajevardi
  • . The 1992 near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and institutions in 13 countries Assistance to Saddam Hussein’s suppression of the 1991 Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish uprisings
  • . The 1981 bombing of the offices of the Islamic Republic Party and of Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei and Bahonar Support for the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by Iranian revolutionaries
  • . The 1970s killings of U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran

  In the early 1970s, angered by U.S. support for the pro-Western shah, MEK members killed several U.S. soldiers and civilians working on defense projects in Iran. Some experts say the attack may have been the work of a Maoist splinter faction operating beyond the Rajavi leadership’s control. MEK members also supported the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, in which 52 Americans were held hostage for 444 days.

  Strength

  MEK is believed to have several thousand members, one-third to one-half of whom are fighters. MEK activities have dropped off in recent years as its membership has dwindled.

  Location/Area of Operation

  The group’s armed unit operated from camps in Iraq near the Iran border since 1986. During the Iraq war, U.S. troops disarmed MEK and posted guards at its bases. In addition to its Paris-based members, MEK has a network of sympathizers in Europe, the United States, and Canada. The group’s political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, maintains offices in several capitals, including Washington, D.C.

  External Aid

  When Saddam Hussein was in power, MEK received the majority of its financial support from the Iraqi regime. It also used front organizations, such as the Muslim Iranian Student’s Society, to collect money from expatriate Iranians and others, according to the State Department’s counterterrorism office. Iraq was MEK’s primary benefactor. Iraq provided MEK with bases, weapons, and protection, and MEK harassed Saddam’s Iranian foes. MEK’s attacks on Iran traditionally intensified when relations between Iran and Iraq grew strained. Iraq encouraged or restrained MEK, depending on Baghdad’s interests.

  Leadership

  Maryam Rajavi is MEK’s principal leader ; her husband, Massoud Rajavi, heads up the group’s military forces. Maryam Rajavi, born in 1953 to an upper-middleclass Iranian family, joined MEK as a student in Tehran in the early 1970s. After relocating with the group to Paris in 1981, she was elected its joint leader and later became deputy commander-in-chief of its armed wing. Massoud Rajavi was last known to be living in Iraq, but authorities aren’t certain of his whereabouts or whether he is alive.

  ---

  Further Reading

  * Camp Ashraf
  * Camp Anzali
  * Camp Faezeh
  * Camp Habib
  * Camp Homayoun
  * Camp Bonyad Alavi
  * MEK Camp

  References

  * Patterns of Global Terrorism : 2002 United States Department of State
  * People’s Mojahedin of Iran Website (In Farsi)
  * National Liberation Army of Iran
  * National Council of Resistance of Iran
  * Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel

• Le terrorisme islamique est une création des États-Unis (Capitaine Martin) 16 janvier 2013 21:48, par Visiteur

  Pepe Escobar

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pepe_Escobar

  Pepe Escobar (born 1954) is a Brazilian investigative journalist. He has worked as a foreign correspondent since 1985, living in Los Angeles, Paris, Milan, Singapore, Bangkok, and Hong Kong. He has focused on Central Asia and the Middle East since the late 1990s. He writes a column- The Roving Eye- for Asia Times Online, as well as regular pieces for Al Jazeera, and Tom Engelhardt’s TomDispatch.com. His columns have been mirrored at Michael Moore.com, The Nation, and The Huffington Post. On television, he has provided political analysis for Russia’s RT network, Al Jazeera’s The Stream, and The Real News Network. On radio, he has been a guest on Sibel Edmonds’ Boiling Frogs Show, The Peter B. Collins Show, Anti War Radio with Scott Horton, What Really Happened Show, Corbett Report, The Voice of Russia’s Burning Point, Ernest Hancock’s FreedomPhoenix.com and The Alex Jones Show. His article, ’Get Osama ! Now ! Or else…’, was published by Asia Times Online two weeks before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. An excerpted paragraph from his column of August 30th, 2001 : "Osama bin Laden - also the No 1 target of the CIA’s counter-terrorism center - is now a superstar playing the bad guy in some sort of planetary Hollywood fiction. Yet inside Afghanistan today, where the Saudi Arabian lives in exile, Osama is a minor character. He is ill and always in hiding - usually "somewhere near Kabul". Once in a while he travels incognito to Peshawar. His organization, the Al Qa’Ida, is split, and in tatters. The Taliban owe him a lot for his past deeds towards the movement and in putting them in power in Afghanistan - contributing with a stack of his own personal fortune of millions of dollars. But no longer an asset, he has become a liability."[1]

  Bibliography

  * Escobar, P. 2007, Globalistan : How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War, Nimble Books.
  * Escobar, P. 2007, Red Zone Blues : A Snapshot of Baghdad During the Surge, Nimble Books.
  * Escobar, P. 2009, Obama Does Globalistan, Nimble Books.

  References

  1. ^ Escobar, P. 2001, ’Get Osama ! Now ! Or else…’, 30 August. Retrieved on 28 April 2008.

  External links

  * Manning, D. & Cotton, M. 2007, ’Embedded with Power : An interview with Pepe Escobar’ (part 1, part 2), Mediabite, no date.
  * The Real News Network
  * The Roving Eye (Asia Times Online)
  * Stories by Pepe Escobar

• Le terrorisme islamique est une création des États-Unis (Capitaine Martin) 16 janvier 2013 22:09, par Visiteur

  
  THE ROVING EYE

  How al-Qaeda got to rule in Tripoli

  http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MH30Ak01.html

  By Pepe Escobar

  Aug 30, 2011

  His name is Abdelhakim Belhaj. Some in the Middle East might have, but few in the West and across the world would have heard of him.

  Time to catch up. Because the story of how an al-Qaeda asset turned out to be the top Libyan military commander in still war-torn Tripoli is bound to shatter - once again - that wilderness of mirrors that is the "war on terror", as well as deeply compromising the carefully constructed propaganda of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) "humanitarian" intervention in Libya.

  Muammar Gaddafi’s fortress of Bab-al-Aziziyah was essentially invaded and conquered last week by Belhaj’s men - who were at the forefront of a militia of Berbers from the mountains southwest of Tripoli. The militia is the so-called Tripoli Brigade, trained in secret for two months by US Special Forces. This turned out to be the rebels’ most effective militia in six months of tribal/civil war.
  Already last Tuesday, Belhaj was gloating on how the battle was won, with Gaddafi forces escaping "like rats" (note that’s the same metaphor used by Gaddafi himself to designate the rebels).

  Abdelhakim Belhaj, aka Abu Abdallah al-Sadek, is a Libyan jihadi. Born in May 1966, he honed his skills with the mujahideen in the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

  He’s the founder of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and its de facto emir - with Khaled Chrif and Sami Saadi as his deputies. After the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996, the LIFG kept two training camps in Afghanistan ; one of them, 30 kilometers north of Kabul - run by Abu Yahya - was strictly for al-Qaeda-linked jihadis.

  After 9/11, Belhaj moved to Pakistan and also to Iraq, where he befriended none other than ultra-nasty Abu Musab al-Zarqawi - all this before al-Qaeda in Iraq pledged its allegiance to Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and turbo-charged its gruesome practices.

  In Iraq, Libyans happened to be the largest foreign Sunni jihadi contingent, only losing to the Saudis. Moreover, Libyan jihadis have always been superstars in the top echelons of "historic" al-Qaeda - from Abu Faraj al-Libi (military commander until his arrest in 2005, now lingering as one of 16 high-value detainees in the US detention center at Guantanamo) to Abu al-Laith al-Libi (another military commander, killed in Pakistan in early 2008).

  Time for an extraordinary rendition

  The LIFG had been on the US Central Intelligence Agency’s radars since 9/11. In 2003, Belhaj was finally arrested in Malaysia - and then transferred, extraordinary rendition-style, to a secret Bangkok prison, and duly tortured.

  In 2004, the Americans decided to send him as a gift to Libyan intelligence - until he was freed by the Gaddafi regime in March 2010, along with other 211 "terrorists", in a public relations coup advertised with great fanfare.

  The orchestrator was no less than Saif Islam al-Gaddafi - the modernizing/London School of Economics face of the regime. LIFG’s leaders - Belhaj and his deputies Chrif and Saadi - issued a 417-page confession dubbed "corrective studies" in which they declared the jihad against Gaddafi over (and illegal), before they were finally set free.

  A fascinating account of the whole process can be seen in a report called "Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration". [1] Note that the authors, Singapore-based terrorism "experts" who were wined and dined by the regime, express the "deepest appreciation to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation for making this visit possible".

  Crucially, still in 2007, then al-Qaeda’s number two, Zawahiri, officially announced the merger between the LIFG and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM). So, for all practical purposes, since then, LIFG/AQIM have been one and the same - and Belhaj was/is its emir.

  In 2007, LIFG was calling for a jihad against Gaddafi but also against the US and assorted Western "infidels".

  Fast forward to last February when, a free man, Belhaj decided to go back into jihad mode and align his forces with the engineered uprising in Cyrenaica.

  Every intelligence agency in the US, Europe and the Arab world knows where he’s coming from. He’s already made sure in Libya that himself and his militia will only settle for sharia law.

  There’s nothing "pro-democracy" about it - by any stretch of the imagination. And yet such an asset could not be dropped from NATO’s war just because he was not very fond of "infidels".

  The late July killing of rebel military commander General Abdel Fattah Younis - by the rebels themselves - seems to point to Belhaj or at least people very close to him.

  It’s essential to know that Younis - before he defected from the regime - had been in charge of Libya’s special forces fiercely fighting the LIFG in Cyrenaica from 1990 to 1995.

  The Transitional National Council (TNC), according to one of its members, Ali Tarhouni, has been spinning Younis was killed by a shady brigade known as Obaida ibn Jarrah (one of the Prophet Mohammed’s companions). Yet the brigade now seems to have dissolved into thin air.

  Shut up or I’ll cut your head off

  Hardly by accident, all the top military rebel commanders are LIFG, from Belhaj in Tripoli to one Ismael as-Salabi in Benghazi and one Abdelhakim al-Assadi in Derna, not to mention a key asset, Ali Salabi, sitting at the core of the TNC. It was Salabi who negotiated with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi the "end" of LIFG’s jihad, thus assuring the bright future of these born-again "freedom fighters".

  It doesn’t require a crystal ball to picture the consequences of LIFG/AQIM - having conquered military power and being among the war "winners" - not remotely interested in relinquishing control just to please NATO’s whims.

  Meanwhile, amid the fog of war, it’s unclear whether Gaddafi is planning to trap the Tripoli brigade in urban warfare ; or to force the bulk of rebel militias to enter the huge Warfallah tribal areas.

  Gaddafi’s wife belongs to the Warfallah, Libya’s largest tribe, with up to 1 million people and 54 sub-tribes. The inside word in Brussels is that NATO expects Gaddafi to fight for months if not years ; thus the Texas George W Bush-style bounty on his head and the desperate return to NATO’s plan A, which was always to take him out.

  Libya may now be facing the specter of a twin-headed guerrilla Hydra ; Gaddafi forces against a weak TNC central government and NATO boots on the ground ; and the LIFG/AQIM nebula in a jihad against NATO (if they are sidelined from power).

  Gaddafi may be a dictatorial relic of the past, but you don’t monopolize power for four decades for nothing, and without your intelligence services learning a thing or two.

  From the beginning, Gaddafi said this was a foreign-backed/al-Qaeda operation ; he was right (although he forgot to say this was above all neo-Napoleonic French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s war, but that’s another story).

  He also said this was a prelude for a foreign occupation whose target was to privatize and take over Libya’s natural resources. He may - again – turn out to be right.

  The Singapore "experts" who praised the Gaddafi regime’s decision to free the LIFG’s jihadis qualified it as "a necessary strategy to mitigate the threat posed to Libya".

  Now, LIFG/AQIM is finally poised to exercise its options as an "indigenous political force".

  Ten years after 9/11, it’s hard not to imagine a certain decomposed skull in the bottom of the Arabian Sea boldly grinning to kingdom come.

  Note

  1. Click here : http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/RSIS_Libya.pdf

  ou : www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/conference_reports/RSIS_Libya.pdf

  ou : http://mai68.org/spip/IMG/pdf/RSIS_Libya.pdf

  Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan : How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues : a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

  He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com.

  To follow Pepe’s articles on the Great Arab Revolt, please click here :

  http://atimes.com/atimes/others/Pepe2011.html

• Le terrorisme islamique est une création des États-Unis (Capitaine Martin) 16 janvier 2013 22:17, par Visiteur

  Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb

  A Case Study in the Opportunism of Global Jihad

  http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qa…

  Apr 03, 2010 Author : Jean-Pierre Filiu

  Al-qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is not only one of the latest offshoots of Usama bin Ladin’s terrorist network, but it is the branch of the global jihad that has most clearly failed to follow its founding guidelines.[1] Launched as a jihadist platform to unify North African militant groups, it has not succeeded in attracting Moroccan and Tunisian cells, and it remains an Algerian-run organization. Hailed as al-Qa`ida’s spearhead against Europe, it has proved unable to strike France or Spain. It has had to rely mainly on the internet to recruit north of the Mediterranean Sea.

  Conceived as a vanguard to push global jihad north into “the land of the infidels,” it instead placed increasing emphasis on its Saharan component to the point that it is now involved in Mali and Niger. This failure makes AQIM a fascinating case to reflect upon the tactical opportunism and the operational reassessment of the global jihad.

  The Delusion of the “Islamic Maghreb”

  Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) emerged in 1998 after splintering from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Although deeply rooted in the complex history of the “black decade” of the 1990s, the GSPC tried since 2004 to distance itself from the heavy legacy of the Algerian civil war and, under the leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdel (also known as Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud), worked hard to join the global arena. The GSPC’s 2007 merger into al-Qa`ida was meant to crown this process by assigning to the former GSPC a new horizon, the “Islamic Maghreb.” This marked a dramatic challenge to the North African regimes that have failed to push forward the “Arab Maghreb” for the past 20 years.[2]

  Three years later, the GSPC’s Algerian hierarchy remains forcefully in charge of AQIM. Non-Algerian activists have not been promoted to the top layer of the group. In Morocco[3] and Tunisia, the jihadist militants who might have been tempted to join AQIM chose to keep their independence, while some Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) members decided to join the FATA-based al-Qa`ida central instead, turning their back on the “Islamic Maghreb.” Non-Algerians were admitted into AQIM on an individual basis, with the exception of a Libyan cell that rose outside of the LIFG and was smuggled into eastern Algeria.[4] Moreover, this Libyan cell was reined in by AQIM, which did not dare expand its violence into the neighboring Jamahiriyya (Libya), probably out of fear of outstretching its already loose chain of command, but also so as not to repeat in Libya the fiasco of the jihadist cell crushed in the suburbs of Tunis in December 2006.[5]

  Therefore, the only North African country where AQIM kept a high profile outside of Algeria became Mauritania. Yet Algerian jihadists already had a long record of involvement in Mauritania, where the Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his brigade (katiba) had provoked the local security forces as early as 2005.[6] The “Islamic Maghreb” that al-Qa`ida central envisioned while endorsing the GSPC was certainly not limited to Algeria and Mauritania. As a result, the North African grand design collapsed primarily under the enduring weight of Algerian chauvinism, still vibrant under its jihadist discourse, and potentially repulsive for Moroccan and Tunisian activists.

  The Mediterranean Wall

  Even before transforming his GSPC into AQIM, Droukdel repeatedly accused France and Spain of waging a full-fledged “crusade” in North Africa and threatened to strike back at the European “oppressors.”[7] Al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri echoed those threats when he welcomed the GSPC into al-Qa`ida.[8] The anti-U.S. jihad in Iraq had triggered in 2003-2006 a triangular dynamic between Europe-based activists,[9] al-Qa`ida operatives in the Middle East, and the GSPC as a regional hub for potential “volunteers.” As a result, al-Qa`ida’s top leadership bet on AQIM to use this Iraqi trend to launch a new wave of terrorism on European soil. Yet the crisis and decline of al-Qa`ida in Iraq since 2007 jeopardized this triangular momentum, and the nascent AQIM could no longer rely on the clarion call for jihad in Iraq to recruit and plot in Europe.

  In his July 2008 interview to the New York Times, Droukdel pledged to “liberate the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of France and Spain and from all symbols of treason and employment for the outsiders, and protect it from the foreign greed and the Crusaders’ hegemony.”[10] This was a defiant way to admit that the focus of anti-Western terror would be in the Maghreb itself, and not in Europe, contrary to what al-Qa`ida central had initially hoped. Therefore, AQIM started to strike “global” targets in its local environment, murdering four French tourists in eastern Mauritania in December 2007, then a French engineer in central Algeria in June 2008.[11] Later, when al-Zawahiri warned on August 5, 2009 that “France will pay for all her crimes,” AQIM reacted by a suicide attack against the French Embassy in Nouakchott three days later.[12]

  The inability to strike European targets on European soil is deeply frustrating for Droukdel and his followers, who invested significantly in the internet to get their message across the Mediterranean. Cyber-jihad, enhanced by the global exposure the integration into al-Qa`ida granted to the former GSPC, remains the trump card for AQIM to regain a foothold in Europe. Thus far, however, international cooperation and enhanced security awareness have managed to thwart this move. In December 2008, for example, a Paris court sentenced Kamel Bouchentouf—a longtime resident of the French city of Nancy—to six years in jail after he admitted corresponding with Salah Gasmi, the AQIM’s propaganda leader, via e-mail.[13] Yet the internet, regardless of how nefarious it can become in the hands of jihadist recruiters, is a poor substitute to physical infiltration and individual radicalization on European soil. As a result, instead of projecting its terror northward, AQIM resigned to direct its violence more and more southward.

  The Mirages of the Sahara

  The southern faction of AQIM was initially a sideshow in the overall planning of the organization, but it steadily gained weight and visibility due to a multi-fold set of inter-related factors : the steady decline of jihadist violence in Algeria and the containment of the bulk of AQIM activity in its stronghold of Kabylie, east of Algiers ;[14] the pressing needs of AQIM’s leadership, who suffered the shrinking of their extortion outreach and demanded a growing contribution from their Saharan affiliates ; and the deepening cooperation between those affiliates and the various smuggling networks, involved in drugs, weapons or illegal immigration.

  This cumulating process played in the hands of Belmokhtar, especially when the abduction of Western nationals in the Sahara—and the subsequent ransoms paid for their release—became crucial to financing the whole AQIM apparatus. Droukdel sought to balance Belmokhtar’s rising power by promoting Hamidu Abu Zeid,[15] whose neighboring katiba kidnapped two Austrian tourists in southern Tunisia in February 2008 and two Canadian UN diplomats in northern Niger in December 2008.[16] While Belmokhtar’s focus on Mauritania meant Mali had to be preserved as a safe haven, Abu Zeid spoiled his rival’s position by moving aggressively into northern Mali.[17] The violent clashes in the beginning of July 2009 opened a new period of turmoil in the central Sahara and eventually spilled into Niger. The competition between the two katiba also involved their partners in criminal activities ; Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid reportedly asked their respective contacts to deliver them Western hostages, which led in a few weeks in late 2009 to the abduction of three Spaniards, two Italians and one French national.[18]

  Despite these turf wars, Droukdel still manages to maintain authority over AQIM, and he was greatly seconded in that regard by his deputy in southern Algeria, Yahya Djouadi, who oversees Belmokhtar as well as Abu Zeid. Yet the contradiction is now open between al-Qa`ida central and AQIM on the issue of kidnapping Western nationals. In only one instance, al-Qa`ida central managed to pressure AQIM into executing one of the hostages, a British tourist, in May 2009, and even in that case AQIM did not give the killing Zarqawi-like publicity.[19] AQIM prefers to trade its captives for undisclosed ransoms or the release of jailed operatives. Now that kidnapping has become the most visible sign of jihadist activity in the Sahara, AQIM is striving to maximize its local benefits even at the cost of clashing with al-Qa`ida central’s global agenda.

  Conclusion

  In the course of its first three years of existence, AQIM has turned away from al-Qa`ida central’s main expectations of the group. AQIM has failed to integrate non-Algerian factions into a truly Maghrebi organization and it has contained its terror to the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Al-Qa`ida as a whole is working hard to live up to its “global” commitment to fight the “far enemy,” but its violence mostly targets fellow Muslims killed on Muslim lands. Furthermore, AQIM, unable to regain the initiative against the Algerian security forces, was forced to enhance its profile in the open spaces of the Sahara.

  The sad irony, however, is that AQIM’s frustrating move southward is opening for al-Qa`ida new opportunities that were not taken into consideration when the GSPC joined the global jihad. The competition between the two AQIM field commanders in the Sahara has led to the recent recruiting of new members originating from countries such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and even Nigeria. The numbers are too limited to speak about a significant breakthrough, but al-Qa`ida central could ultimately benefit from this development that none of its leaders foresaw when deciding to launch AQIM. This would then be a puzzling demonstration of the successful opportunism of the global jihad.

  D^r. Jean-Pierre Filiu is professor at Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po), and has been visiting professor at Georgetown University. He authored several books at Fayard, in Paris, including Mitterrand and Palestine (2005) and The Boundaries of Jihad (2006). The French History Convention awarded its 2008 main prize to his Apocalypse in Islam. His most recent book is called The Nine Lives of Al-Qaeda.

  [1] AQIM was established in January 2007, and it was the result of a merger between the GSPC and al-Qa`ida.

  [2] The Union for the Arab Maghreb (Union du Maghreb Arabe) was established in 1989 among Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya.

  [3] Carlos Echeverria Jesus, “The Current State of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group,” CTC Sentinel 2:3 (2009).

  [4] For instance, in August 2007 four Libyan fighters were killed by the security forces south of Tebessa. For details, see Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb (Pretoria : Institute of Security Studies, 2008), p. 49.

  [5] Ridha Kéfi, “Le Maghreb face à la pieuvre jihadiste,” Afkar/Idées n°14, summer 2007, pp. 50-53.

  [6] This brigade switched from the GIA to the GSPC in 2000.

  [7] Le Monde, June 26, 2005 ; Le Monde, September 29, 2005.

  [8] Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Local and Global Jihad : Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghrib,” Middle East Journal 63:2 (2009) : p. 223.

  [9] For the case of Spain, see Javier Jordan, “Anatomy of Spain’s 28 Disrupted Networks,” CTC Sentinel 1:11 (2008).

  [10] “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008.

  [11] For details on these incidents, see “Travel Warning,” U.S. Department of State, December 2, 2009 ; “Deadly Bombings Hit Algerian Town,” BBC, August 20, 2008.

  [12] For the English transcript of this August 5, 2009 al-Zawahiri speech, see www.nefafoundation.org/misce….

  [13] Isabelle Mandraud, “Frère Abou Zhara, apprenti jihadiste ou infiltré de la DST,” Le Monde, December 19, 2008.

  [14] Hanna Rogan, “Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11,” CTC Sentinel 1:12 (2008).

  [15] Hamidu (Abdel Hamid) Abu Zeid, born in 1965, is slightly older than Droukdel and Belmokhtar, but he was only a junior commander until 2004 when he replaced “al-Para” as the GSPC’s leader for southeastern Algeria.

  [16] “Al-Qaeda Claims Austrian Hostages,” BBC, March 10, 2008 ; Steven Edwards and Glen McGregor, “Canadian Diplomats Missing, Feared Kidnapped in Niger,” Canwest News Service, December 15, 2008.

  [17] On June 11, 2009, some of Abu Zeid’s followers killed a senior intelligence officer in Timbuktu.

  [18] The French national was released in February 2010, and shortly after one of the Spanish detainees was released. The Italian couple was recently set free in April.

  [19] Ignacio Cembrero, “Cautivos de Al-Qaeda,” El Pais, January 10, 2010.

• Le terrorisme islamique est une création des États-Unis (Capitaine Martin) 16 janvier 2013 22:41, par Visiteur

  

  (cliquer l’image pour l’agrandir)

  Experts told ABC News they are concerned that the weapons stockpiles ? including as many as 20,000 surface-to-air missiles ? are out in the open and could fall into the hands of terrorists. (Human Rights Watch)

  Al Qaeda Terror Group : We ’Benefit From’ Libyan Weapons

  http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qa…

  By LEE FERRAN (@leeferran) and RYM MOMTAZ (@RymMomtaz)
  Nov. 10, 2011

  A leading member of an al Qaeda-affiliated terror group indicated the organization may have acquired some of the thousands of powerful weapons that went missing in the chaos of the Libyan uprising, stoking long-held fears of Western officials.

  "We have been one of the main beneficiaries of the revolutions in the Arab world," Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a leader of the north Africa-based al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM], told the Mauritanian news agency ANI Wednesday. "As for our benefiting from the [Libyan] weapons, this is a natural thing in these kinds of circumstances."

  The claim comes just days after the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling on Libya and its neighbors to secure the loose weapons — including some 20,000 man-portable surface-to-air missiles — before they could fall into the hands of terrorists. The resolution specifically mentioned AQIM as a dangerous potential beneficiary.

  An official with the State Department, which has been at the head of the hunt for loose Libyan weapons for the U.S., told ABC News the department was aware of AQIM’s claim and, while they’ve been unable to confirm any weapons have made their way into the terror group’s hands, the possibility is "obviously of great concern."

  "We know al Qaeda has been long in pursuit of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles," the official said. "This is a threat to which we’re paying close attention."

  Since the fall of Tripoli in late August, multiple weapons depots with stockpiles of heat seeking surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns and ammunition have been discovered unguarded by journalists and NGOs. Peter Bouckaert of Human Rights Watch first warned about the problem after a trip to Libya earlier this year and shot a video featuring a huge cache of unguarded weapons last month.

  "I myself could have removed several hundred [missiles] if I wanted to, and people can literally drive up with pickup trucks or even 18 wheelers and take away whatever they want," said Bouckaert, HRW’s emergencies director. "Every time I arrive at one of these weapons facilities, the first thing we notice going missing is the surface-to-air missiles."

  Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Shapiro told ABC News last month there was "obviously" a race on to secure the weapons before terrorists get their hands on them and that the U.S. planned to have 50 teams of weapons specialists on the ground in Libya to do just that. That deployment is ongoing, a State Department official said today.

  "Matching up a terrorist with a shoulder-fired missile, that’s our worst nightmare," Sen. Barbara Boxer, D.-California, a member of the Senate’s Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, said in September. The surface-to-air missiles represent a grave danger to civilian commercial aircraft, U.S. officials said.

  While the U.S. may be expanding its search in Libya, there have already been reports of neighboring countries in all directions intercepting the smuggled Libyan weapons.

  To the east of Libya, smuggled surface-to-air missiles are so ubiquitous in Egypt that the black market price for one has actually dropped by more than 50 percent, according to a report by The Washington Post. To its south, Nigerian forces said they had clashed with a heavily-armed convoy heading out of Libya and seized heavy machine guns and rockets they were carrying, the BBC reported. AQIM is primarily based in the north African region to Libya’s west.

  ABC News’ Brian Ross and Matthew Cole contributed to this report.